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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
Is there a way to avoid trading off one capability for another in manufacturing? The prevailing wisdom 
says no. But some manufacturers seem to have been able to defy that: compared to their competitors, 
they have better quality, are more dependable, respond faster to changing market conditions, and in spite 
of all that, achieve lower costs. How can this be explained?  
Our aim here is to provide an explanation. We contend that the nature of the trade-offs 
among manufacturing capabilities is more complex than has been assumed. Depending on the approach 
taken for developing each capability, the nature of the trade-offs change. In certain cases not only can 
trade-offs be avoided altogether, but in fact one capability would enhance another. They become 
cumulative. Moreover, when a capability is developed in this way, it is likely to be more lasting and less 
fragile than if it were developed at the expense of other capabilities.  
We go on to suggest a model which shows how this can be done: To build cumulative and 
lasting manufacturing capability, management attention and resources should go first toward enhancing 
quality, then-while the efforts to enhance qualify are further expanded-attention should be paid to 
improve also the dependability of the production system, then-and again while efforts on the previous two 
are further enhanced-production flexibility (or reaction speed) should also be improved, and finally, 
while all these efforts are further enlarged, direct attention can be paid to cost efficiency. We use data 
from 1988 European Manufacturing Futures Survey (167 respondents) to test and illustrate our model.  
While we cannot “prove” our model, nevertheless, we believe there is enough evidence for a 
critical reexamination of traditional managerial approaches for improving manufacturing performance. 
For example, except for the cases when there are obvious slacks in the production system, the belief that 
costs can come down quickly and lastingly needs to be questioned. Lasting cost efficiency in production 
can be achieved only through improvements in other capabilities.  
 
 
 
  
Lasting Improvements in Manufacturing Performance 2 
 
INTRODUCTION  
Some manufacturers seem to be able to defy the commonly accepted production logic. Compared to their 
competitors, they have better quality, are more dependable, respond faster to changing market 
requirements and, in spite of all that, achieve lower costs. How do they manage to do that? The prevailing 
production management paradigm, set forth by Skinner (1966) and refined by scholars who followed him, 
seems to imply that this should not be possible. Achieving competitive strength along one of these 
yardsticks should come at the expense of the rest.  
Yet increasingly we are witnessing the emergence of manufacturers who seem not to have traded off one 
capability to develop another. Many companies engaged in quality improvement programs, particularly in 
their manufacturing systems, also report lower costs. Deming (1982), Juran, Gryna and Bingham (1974), 
Crosby (1979), Garvin (1987), and many others including Skinner himself (1986), have offered 
explanations of how and why this occurs. They show that improvements in cost efficiency and quality 
performance in manufacturing are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but that better cost efficiency can, 
in fact, be a consequence of investment in quality improvement programs. Interestingly enough, this does 
not seem to work in reverse – i.e., increasing cost efficiency does not seem to improve quality. So the 
trade-off seems to work in one way but not the other.  
New insights about the relationship between other capabilities are more scarce. The practitioner’s 
literature describes factories which are capable of producing a variety of products quickly and efficiently. 
Yamazaki machine tool factory in the United Kingdom, for example, offers four times more models in the 
third of the time normal to the industry, while the quality of their products “matches or beats” the high 
Japanese standard (Jones, et al. (1988)). Nippon Denso’s radiator factory in Japan can shift from one 
model to another with no appreciable loss of efficiency. Apple Computer’s Cork factory (in Ireland) can 
assemble various models of computers simultaneously on the same assembly line without changeover 
penalty.  
These, plus many other examples, call for a fresh reexamination of whether there is a way to avoid the 
common trade-offs in production. Jaikumar (1986) offers an indication for the relationship between 
flexibility and dependability of the production process. His comparison of flexible machining systems in 
the United States and Japan revealed that higher flexibility was associated with greater dependability: 
those companies that had made their production systems more reliable-essentially through increasing the 
level of knowledge about the production process in the company-could run their machines more flexibly. 
Again, the reverse does not appear to be true; that is, increasing flexibility does not seem to make the 
process more dependable.  
In our own research in the last six years, comparing manufacturing practices of large companies in 
Europe, North America, and Japan (Ferdows, et al. (1986); De Meyer, et al. (1989); Miller, et al. (1989)), 
we have noted that manufacturers use a multitude of different approaches for developing similar 
capabilities. Many of the excellent manufacturers in Europe, North America, and particularly Japan seem 
to follow a distinct sequence of improvement programs which aim at building one capability upon, and 
not instead of, another.  
Do these observations invalidate the trade-off theory completely? The answer is no; there are clearly 
many cases where the trade-off theory applies forcefully. What these observations suggest, simply, is that 
this theory is not valid under all contingencies. In other words, the nature of the trade-offs depends on 
certain other factors. In the examples cited above, as we shall explain further, it is more reasonable to 
assume that the different capabilities have been cumulative and not the result of compromises and trade-
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offs. We need, therefore, a more comprehensive theory which explains the achievements of these 
excellent manufacturers.  
The essence of our thesis in this paper is that excellence in manufacturing is perhaps built on a common 
set of fundamental principles which are easier to get in place starting with one particular type of activity, 
and then pursuing other activities that expand and enrich this set of principles. The sequence is important 
because it is the combination of organizational priorities which form the best vehicle for enhancing the 
appropriate foundation principles. The appropriate sequence would help the organization to go after 
substance, and not just form.  
The sequence we suggest in this paper is one which puts the quality at the base; then-while the efforts on 
quality improvement continue and expand-focuses also on improving the dependability of the production 
process; next, again while the previous efforts are expanded, also pays attention to improving the reaction 
speed and flexibility of the production system. It is then, while all previous efforts continue to expand, 
that direct attention to cost efficiency is justified.  
We shall explain all this in greater detail in the following pages, but we hope that this short introduction 
shows the implications of what we suggest. If our arguments are convincing, then many current practices 
and, more important, mindsets in the management of production must be reexamined. New theories of 
such scope are seldom “proved” quickly, and we do not claim to have done that in this paper. We realize 
that this paper does not put this issue to rest, but our conclusions can serve as propositions for future 
debate and research. 
 
THE RESEARCH BASE  
To develop our arguments we use selected data available through the European Manufacturing Futures 
Project.7 Administered at INSEAD since 1983, this is a project in which a sample of large European 
manufacturing companies are surveyed once a year through a mailed questionnaire. For this paper, we 
have used the results of the 1988 survey (see Appendix 1 for a description of the sample). It should be 
mentioned that the sample is biased towards large, well performing manufacturing units and is not 
entirely representative of Europe’s manufacturing industry.  
Two specific sets of data from this survey are analyzed here. The first set is the change in eight 
performance indicators between 1985 and 1987. The respondents were asked to take 1985 as a base year 
for each of the performance indicators listed in Table 1 and give their perception of how much each had 
changed by the end of 1987. Table 1 shows the sample means and standard deviations for each of the 
eight indicators. For example, a score of 109 for quality (conformance to design) means that from 1985 to 
1987 quality was perceived to have improved by 9%. In total 167 respondents filled out this question.  
Second, we used the data on specific improvement programs in manufacturing recently implemented by 
the respondents. A list of 39 specific improvement programs was given in the questionnaire and the 
respondents were asked to indicate those which they had greatly emphasized in the previous year. The full 
list of these programs is shown in Appendix 2.  
 
THE TRADE-OFF MODEL  
In his seminal work, Skinner (1966) made several important contributions. Foremost among them was the 
need to identify the “manufacturing mission,” i.e., what should manufacturing do to enhance the 
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competitive strategy of the company. He questioned the prevailing narrow view of the strategic role of 
manufacturing in many companies – a view which reduced the role to merely being cost efficient. Instead, 
he suggested a broad list of strategically useful capabilities that could be developed in manufacturing. A 
company could choose the one(s) which best fitted its business strategy. The generic capabilities often 
mentioned in his work and other contributors such as Hayes and Wheelwright (1984), Hill (1985), 
Schmenner (1987), to name a few, have been cost efficiency, quality, dependability, and flexibility. More 
recent authors have expanded and refined this list, but their suggestions can still be classified within these 
four generic manufacturing capabilities.  
 We do not question the need for identifying the manufacturing mission in the company and for choosing 
among the many possibilities which are available. That is not the trade-off we are referring to here. Our 
focus here is on how the specific capability(ies) demanded by the manufacturing mission is (are) 
developed. The literature suggests that in this process there are trade-offs among these capabilities, that a 
factory cannot do well on many yardsticks. It is the theory behind this trade-off that we are examining in 
this paper.  
According to this theory, unless there is slack in the system, improvement of one of the generic 
capabilities is possible only at the expense of the others: a company which is operating its manufacturing 
system at industry standards (what the economists refer to as being close to “the efficient frontier” of its 
resource utilization), cannot be expected to improve two or more capabilities simultaneously. For 
example, a company which opts for flexibility of its production, if successful, would improve the 
flexibility but its cost efficiency or dependability of its deliveries might fall behind industry standards. 
The only way a company can improve in more than one generic capability simultaneously is when it has 
been operating with slack – e.g., poor layout, obsolete machinery, poor suppliers, wrong production scale, 
etc.  
We turn to our data to test the hypotheses based on the trade-off theory: the number of manufacturers in 
our sample that have improved only one of these generic capabilities is likely to be greater than those that 
have improved any two capabilities simultaneously; those that have improved two are likely to be more 
than those that have improved three capabilities simultaneously, and so on. These hypotheses can be 
expressed more generally: the frequency of the number of performance indicators simultaneously 
improved should follow a negative exponential distribution.  
The data analyzed were the changes in the eight performance measures from 1985 to 1987 (Table 1). 
Since, as mentioned previously, our sample is biased towards large, well performing manufacturing units, 
we have assumed that most of them were not operating with slacks in their production systems in 1985.  
The first thing to do was to translate these eight measures to the four generic capabilities. This turned out 
to be a rather straightforward task because we found that performance indicators within the four broad 
categories are indeed highly correlated (Table 2). Improvements in unit cost and overhead cost, for 
example, are highly correlated (coefficient = .28, significance more than 99%). More examples can be 
seen in Table 2.  
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Table 1: Changes in Performance Indicators 1985-87 
Indices for  1987 (1985 – 100) 
  Mean Standard Deviation 
Quality conformance  109  17 
Unit production cost  100  14 
Inventory turnover  113  27 
Development speed  106  19 
On-time delivery  108  17 
Delivery speed  108  19 
Overhead costs  100  15 
Batch sizes  98  29 
Source: 1988 European Manufacturing Futures Survey (De Meyer and Ferdows, 1988)  
Table 2: CORRELATION BETWEEN THE PERFORMANCE INDICES 
  Unit 
Production 
Inventory 
Turnover 
Development 
speed 
On-time 
delivery 
Delivery 
Speed 
Overhead 
costs 
Batch 
sizes 
Quality conformance .04 .08 .19** .17* .09 .06  
Unit production cost - -.0l  -.08  -0.14  -.10 .28** -.07 
Inventory turnover  - .01  .21**  .22** .08 -.11 
Development speed   - .29**  .27** .05 .18* 
On-time Delivery     .51** .02 .03 
Delivery speed      .03 .16* 
Overhead costs       .06 
** p < 0.01 *p < 0.05 
Source: 1988 European Manufacturing Futures Survey (De Meyer and Ferdows, 1988)  
 
So, to test the hypothesis derived from the “trade-off theory,” we chose four indicators which are close to 
the traditional four categories of cost efficiency, quality, flexibility and dependability. The four were unit 
manufacturing cost, quality conformance (i.e., producing according to the specifications), speed of new 
product introduction, and delivery dependability.  
Figure 1 shows the number of respondents corresponding to improvement in none, one, two, three or all 
four of these performance indicators. If we leave out the category of companies which improved none of 
the four indicators, the trade-off theory would have predicted that the group of companies which have 
improved only one of the four measures would be the most numerous. This hypothesis has to be rejected! 
A large majority (62%) improved more than one capability. Although the subsequent hypotheses – e.g., 
those that improved two would be more numerous than those that improved three or four capabilities – 
cannot be rejected, the general hypothesis of negative exponential distribution of the number of 
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simultaneously improved measures should also be rejected.  
Given our assumption about the absence of slack (discussed previously), only two possible explanations 
remain. Either the companies which improved performance on more than one measure are paying for that 
elsewhere (and we are not capturing where in our analysis), or the trade-off theory itself has to be 
modified. The first explanation is not supported by the additional data collected in our survey on the 
responding companies. As seen in Appendix 1, our sample seems to be biased toward well performing 
companies in terms of growth and profit. While it is of course possible that the penalties are incurring 
elsewhere, unknown to us, we believe it is prudent to consider the second explanation seriously and 
question the trade-off theory itself.  
FIGURE 1: Simultaneous Improvements in Performance Indicators 
Measuring Quality Conformance, Delivery Dependability, Development Speed, and Unit Production Cost 
 
Source: 1988 European Manufacturing Futures Survey (De Meyer and Ferdows, 1988) 
 
THE CUMULATIVE MODEL  
A few years ago Jinichiro Nakane proposed that the Japanese manufacturers follow a rather specific 
sequence for building manufacturing capabilities (Nakane (1986)):  
In general, if some [Japanese] companies want to offer ‘flexibility’ as a competitive priority, it is necessary 
that at least they have already qualified for a minimum level of abilities on quality, dependability and cost 
improvement. If they have not such an ability, they get a chaos condition and end tragically.  
On the basis of his experience with Japanese companies and a survey similar to the European 
Manufacturing Futures administered in Japan, he suggested a cumulative model with quality 
improvement as the basis of all other improvements, followed by dependability. According to this model, 
one should only improve on dependability if the quality level in the company has reached a critical level. 
His sequence continues by asserting that quality and dependability improvements are preconditions to 
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cost efficiency improvements; cost efficiency becomes almost a consequence of quality and dependability 
improvements. Finally, flexibility improvements can only be obtained if a company has its quality, 
dependability and cost efficiency under control. This model has been documented further in Ferdows, et 
al. (1986) and De Meyer, et al. (1989).  
In our own research, we have modified this model. Though we accept that cost improvements remain the 
ultimate goal of most manufacturers, we see these cost improvements also as an ultimate consequence of 
resources and management efforts invested in the improvement of quality, dependability and reaction 
speed of the company. The sequence we see is the following. A precondition to all lasting improvements 
in manufacturing capabilities is improvements in the quality performance of the company. Once the 
efforts in improvements in quality get underway and some results are obtained, while the efforts to 
improve the quality continue to expand, some efforts should be focused on making the production process 
more dependable. Next, improvement of speed should be added to these efforts-again, while the activities 
aimed at improving the quality and dependability are further enhanced and expanded. (Speed of response 
in manufacturing is essentially the way manufacturing flexibility can be gauged-i.e., how fast production 
can react to new customer requirements, changing production volumes, introduction of new product, etc.) 
Improvements in speed should be built cumulatively upon the foundations of quality and dependability. It 
is after these efforts are put in place that the company should start programs which are aimed directly at 
cost efficiency improvements, and again, do that while all the previous efforts continue to expand at 
increasingly higher rates. Cost improvements which result from this pattern of allocation of management 
attention and resources will be more lasting, and ultimately the company will be able to enjoy improved 
performance in quality, dependability, flexibility, and cost efficiency simultaneously.  
We have sometimes depicted this cumulative model as a sand cone with different layers (Figure 2). The 
sand is, in this case, a stand-in for management effort and resources. To obtain a sand cone, one has to 
create first a stable foundation of quality improvements. Pouring more sand, one enlarges the quality 
foundation while starting also tackling the dependability of the production system. To build a taller sand 
cone, an increasing amount of sand needs to be poured, thereby while enhancing the quality and 
dependability layers, building the foundation for improving the speed of response of manufacturing. By 
pouring still more sand, and enhancing the foundation layers of quality, dependability, and speed still 
further, one can start building stable and well-founded cost improvement programs.  
FIGURE 2: Development Of Lasting Manufacturing Capabilities 
The Sand Cone Model 
  
Lasting Improvements in Manufacturing Performance 8 
 
 
This analogy helps us explain an important characteristic of our model: that moving up each step in the 
path towards development of lusting manufacturing capabilities requires exponentially more efforts to go 
for the earlier steps. For example, to improve the cost efficiency by 10%, it will be necessary to improve 
the speed by a larger percentage, say 15, dependability by yet a larger percentage, say 25, and quality by 
still larger, say 40%. Once again, we should clarify that we are not saying that this is the only way to 
reduce costs; what we are saying is that even when there are no slacks in the system, costs can be reduced 
at no expense in terms of other capabilities-in fact by enhancing the other capabilities. Moreover, 
improvements obtained in this manner, being essentially due to deeper penetration of good manufacturing 
management practices in the organization, would be more stable and likely to last.  
An obvious criticism of this model is that we seem to throw all contingencies overboard. The model 
seems to suggest that there is only one best way to achieve a multiple set of manufacturing capabilities. 
To some extent, this is indeed our belief. Our model shows the way for an organization to go after 
substance and avoid chasing form; it shows the best vehicle for putting the fundamental principles of 
good manufacturing in place and continually expanding and enriching that set of principles. We have not 
attempted to identify and list these principles here, but they can be attention to details, aggressive 
investment in increasing knowledge of the production process, allowing active experimentation, direct 
contribution by everyone in continuous improvements, looking beyond small production microcosms, 
blurring the organizational demarcation lines, etc. With our model, we are implying that by focusing on 
quality first, the seeds of these organizational abilities are nurtured more than if the emphasis had been 
say on cost efficiency. While the quality efforts get on their way, by focusing also on making the 
system more dependable, the organization identifies the gaps in its knowledge and the reliability of 
its systems. Again, it would be premature to push cost efficiency aggressively at this stage. The next 
stage, speed, nurtures these principles further. By focusing on time reduction, more improvement ideas 
can be generated and implemented. The organizational abilities are further nurtured, and by now most of 
the efforts in the organization are directed towards the cost drivers, knowing that if they can be improved, 
the costs will improve. So at this stage some direct attention to cost efficiency efforts will be justified. A 
manufacturing capability developed in such a cumulative manner is likely to be more deeply ingrained in 
deep organizational abilities, hence will be more lasting. 
Once the essence of our suggested approach is understood, the specific things that a company might do to 
enhance quality, dependability, flexibility (speed), and cost efficiency of its manufacturing may of course 
be chosen from a wide range of possibilities. The concepts of quality (Garvin (1987)), dependability 
(Jaikumar (1986)), flexibility (Swamidass and Newell (1987)) and cost efficiency are so broad that the 
individual company can clearly differentiate itself from its competitors by choosing its own combination 
of programs. Therefore, even though different business strategies may call for different capabilities from 
the manufacturing function, there is still a similarity of approach among those who build lasting and 
stable capabilities.  
Once again, we should emphasize that in all our arguments, we are referring to companies that are 
operating generally at industry standards. If, for example, a company’s factory is clearly below the 
minimum efficient size, then naturally it first must find a remedy for that before venturing on the road that 
we suggest.  
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APPLYING THE SAND CONE MODEL 
If our sand cone model is valid, then the programs for improvement of quality should be associated with 
improvements in the largest number of performance indicators-not only with those directly related to 
quality itself, but also those related to dependability, flexibility and cost efficiency. The programs related 
to improving the dependability of the production process-making deliveries more reliable, learning more 
about the process and generally making the production more reliable and predictable- should have the 
second most number of performance indicators, and so on with the cost improvement programs to show 
only results in improved cost efficiency and not the other capabilities.  
To test this hypothesis, for each performance indicator we first compared the improvement programs 
undertaken by two groups of companies: those which had achieved above average improvement for that 
indicator, with those who had not improved performance along that indicator at all. (To sharpen the 
contrast, we excluded the middle group-i.e., those companies with improvements below sample average.)  
Let us take the quality conformance as an example. The first group consisted of those companies who had 
a 1987 rating of above 109 (please refer to Table 1); the second group consisted of those with a 1987 
conformance indicator less than or equal to 100. (The excluded group consisted of companies with ratings 
between 100 and 109).  
Turning to the second set of data described earlier, we then examined the recent improvement programs 
undertaken by each group. The objective was to identify along which of the 39 specific improvement 
programs (list in Appendix 2) the two groups differed. We did a similar analysis for each of the other 
seven performance indicators. The results are summarized in Table 3.  
More specifically, Table 3 shows the differences in the activities of the high (i.e., better-than-average) and 
low (i.e., worse-than-before) performers for each of the eight indicators. We included only those 
programs which received significantly different emphasis by the two groups. By “significant” we mean a 
confidence level of at least 95% that each of these programs had been emphasized by one group more 
than the other. With this type of analysis, strictly speaking, one can only discern association and not 
causality – i.e., theoretically one cannot be sure whether the observed performance was the result of the 
action program, or conversely, the program was undertaken because of the observed performance. Going 
beyond the strict theoretical interpretation, we believe it is reasonable to assume that better or worse 
performance on the specific indicator was (at least partly) due to the emphasis (or its lack) of the 
particular programs listed in Table 3. These are the programs which “made a difference.”  
Careful reading of Table 3 provides support for the cumulative theory. The program which shows an 
impact on the largest number of performance indicators is the “zero defect.” The “better-than-average” 
performers in quality conformance, in on-time delivery, in speed of new product development, and in 
inventory turnover have all emphasized zero-defect programs significantly more than the “worse-than-
before” group. The effect of this seemingly quality improvement program is not just in improving quality 
conformance, but also in a dimension of dependability (on-time delivery), and flexibility (development 
speed, and one may include inventory turnover here as well as a measure somewhere between flexibility 
and cost efficiency).  
Other quality improvement programs also exhibit the same multiple impact, although not as much as 
zero-defect. Statistical quality control of process not only improves quality conformance (as one would 
expect) but it also improves unit production cost. Programs for improving vendor quality, improve not 
only quality conformance, but also the speed of new product development.  
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These are evidence that the quality improvement programs have far reaching effects; they allow the 
company to achieve better performance along several measures-some of which, like improving 
development speed, could have been considered as unlikely according to the trade-off theory.  
Table 3: Relationship between Manufacturing Improvement Programs and Performance Indicators 
Performance Measure Programs emphasized more by  
better-than-average group 
Programs emphasized more by 
worse-than-before group 
Quality (conformance 
to design) 
Giving workers more planning responsibility  
  Zero defects  
  Value analysis/product redesign  
  Group technology  
  Narrowing product lines/ standardization  
  Vendor quality  
  Reconditioning physical plants  
  Flexible manufacturing systems  
  Process Statistical Quality Control  
  Quality circles  
Unit Production Cost  Developing new processes for existing products Giving workers more planning 
responsibility 
  Process Statistical Quality Control  Plant relocation 
 Inventory turnover  Zero defects Capacity expansion 
  Just-in-Time Plant relocation 
   Narrowing product 
lines/standardization 
   Integration of information systems 
across functions 
   Reducing size of manufacturing 
units 
Speed of new product 
development  
Zero defects  Reducing size of manufacturing 
units 
 Value analysis/product redesign  
 Developing new processes for new products  
  Integration of information systems in 
manufacturing 
  
  Vendor quality  
  Improving new product introduction capability  
On-time delivery  Giving workers more planning responsibility  
  Zero defects  
Delivery speed   Manufacturing reorganization 
    Integration of information systems 
across functions 
Overhead costs  Value analysis/product redesign  
  Capacity expansion  
  Defining a manufacturing strategy  
 Automating jobs   
Batch sizes  Manufacturing lead time reduction  
  Reducing set-up times  
  Closing plants  
  Just-in-Time  
   
Source: 1988 European Manufacturing Futures Survey (De Meyer and Ferdows, 1988) 
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Our evidence for the remaining layers, unfortunately, is scant. This is partly due to the fact that our 
questionnaire was not really designed for testing our cumulative model; most of the other 39 
improvement programs listed there can be interpreted to aim for a hybrid of quality, dependability, 
flexibility, and cost-efficiency. Another problem is the time lag: in our analysis we have not adjusted for 
the time lag between embarking on an improvement program and its effect on the performance 
improvements.  
Nevertheless, certain patterns can still be discerned. For example, “giving workers more planning 
responsibility” can be argued to aim at a hybrid of quality and dependability. The results in Table 3 show 
that both quality and on-time delivery improve when this program is emphasized, but interestingly 
enough, not the unit production cost. This may look disappointing, unless we take the interpretation 
offered by our model. According to our model, giving the workers more planning responsibilities has 
more immediate effects on quality and dependability (two adjacent base layers of our model), but it will 
be a while before it works its way up to cost efficiency. This interpretation implies that those who are 
emphasizing this program are doing so, not because they have accepted a bit of inefficiency in costs, but 
because they are convinced that in the long-run costs will come down.  
Another pair of programs in Table 3, “integration of information systems in manufacturing” and 
“integration of information systems across functions,” deserve attention. Emphasis on the former seems to 
improve the speed of new product introduction; emphasis on the latter seems to reduce delivery speed and 
inventory turnover.  
How can this be explained? Why should delivery speed and inventory turnover, which are usually a more 
direct aim of such programs, be decreased and speed of new product introduction, which is a more 
indirect aim, be increased? We can try many explanations ranging from poor project management and 
irrational choice of computerized systems-resulting in information overload and confusion in certain 
areas-to attributing the oddity of these observations to the limitations inherent in questionnaire surveys 
and small samples. But a partial explanation can also be provided by our sand cone model. Perhaps what 
we are observing is an indication that the average company in our sample engaged in implementation of 
these information systems, having achieved some flexibility (i.e., faster introduction of new products), 
must now wait for cost efficiency results (proxied by inventory turnover ratio) to improve. If one accepts 
this explanation, there is an interesting corollary. Though performance improvements are cumulative, it 
does not mean that they are simultaneous. To see the cumulative effects of improvements in quality or 
dependability or reaction speed on cost efficiency, one needs time. One needs to have some tolerance for 
the cost efficiency improvement to come through.  
The interested reader might make other observations from Table 3, some of which may not be directly 
relevant to the thesis of this paper. Our own conclusion is that, although we are far short of “proving” the 
universal applicability of our sand cone model, there is enough evidence to justify questioning the 
existing trade-off paradigm and searching for a new cumulative theory in the direction we are suggesting.  
 
NEW PERSPECTIVE ON MANUFACTURING PERFORMANCE  
The cumulative theory provides a new perspective with which to judge achievements in manufacturing 
performance. Let us illustrate it by two examples. Suppose a company reports better manufacturing costs 
but worse quality, delivery dependability and/or flexibility. If there is no evidence that the company was 
operating with slacks before — e.g., its factory was not below the minimum efficient size, it was not 
poorly laid out, it did not suffer from severe under capacity utilization, its machinery was not obsolete, 
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etc. — our sand cone model suggests, a priori, that this cost reduction has not been due to lasting 
improvements in the manufacturing capabilities of the company. It suggests that the cost reduction may 
have been due to other reasons such as increased out-sourcing, benefits from foreign exchange 
fluctuations, temporary cuts in overheads and investment programs, “milking” the existing resources 
without rejuvenating them, or changes in accounting practices. All these have essentially little to do 
with how well production is managed in the company. The trade-off theory, in contrast, would raise no 
such questions a priori.  
In another example, assume two companies report faster introduction of new products through 
manufacturing; one does that with lower production costs but poorer quality, and the other with better 
quality but poorer costs. Everything else is the same for the two companies. Which one is building more 
lasting manufacturing capabilities? Our sand cone model suggests the latter, whereas the trade-off model 
takes no position, a priori. Again, the reason is in the specific sequence of improvements proposed in our 
model.  
There are therefore many situations where the same observation interpreted by the trade-off or cumulative 
theories can lead to different conclusions.  
Since our assertion can be considered radical, to avoid any possible confusion, perhaps it is useful to point 
out once again exactly what our sand cone model proposes. To begin with, it does not deny existence of 
trade-off among generic manufacturing capabilities; all it suggests is that the nature of trade-off 
relationships is contingent upon the approach. For example, cost and quality are traded off against each 
other if the attention is put on the cost; however, they both improve if the attention is put on quality.  
Next, with our sand cone model we suggest a specific pattern of capability enhancement which changes 
the traditional trade-offs among the generic manufacturing capabilities. The conventional paradigms of 
production, and the prevailing mindsets, when critically examined, often tend to put cost efficiency at the 
base and a prerequisite to allowing investments in quality, dependability or flexibility. Our sand cone 
model proposes precisely that lasting cost improvements can only be the result of cumulative 
improvements in the other areas. Hence, if a factory is gradually losing its cost efficiency, before needing 
tight financial discipline and control, it needs discipline and attention to enhancing quality, dependability, 
and flexibility of its production system.  
Finally, our model is dynamic in nature. It focuses on continuous changes in the performance and not on 
the base value. Even if a company is already producing at high quality, to continue to enhance its 
manufacturing capability, it will have to continue to improve its quality further. The model suggests that 
for every increase in cost efficiency or flexibility, a supplementary effort in quality will be needed. 
Regardless of its level, for every lasting marginal improvement in one capability, a somewhat larger 
improvement in the underlying capabilities will be required.  
In practice, probably only a few companies follow the .pattern of resource allocation prescribed by our 
sand cone model exactly. Even the well performing manufacturing companies, such as the respondents to 
our 1988 European Manufacturing Futures Survey (Appendix l), are  probably following a hybrid of 
various patterns. Using our model as a gauge, we can make a rough assessment of the build up of lasting 
manufacturing capabilities.  
To illustrate this point, we performed another analysis on the first set of data from the 1988 European 
Manufacturing Futures Survey. We went back to the four performance measures described earlier. They 
were quality conformance, delivery dependability, speed of new production development, and unit 
manufacturing cost. You will recall that we chose these four because they represented the available eight 
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performance indicators well and because each corresponded rather closely to the generic manufacturing 
capabilities of quality, dependability, flexibility and cost efficiency.  
For our analysis, we chose to examine the group of respondents who had reported improvement in 
performance in more than one capability—i.e., those who had improved performance in at least two of 
the four, quality, delivery, speed, and cost indicators. This group consisted of 102 companies (62% of the 
sample). We then calculated the frequency which each of the four indicators happened to be among those 
improved. If quality was the most frequent, followed by delivery, followed by speed, and with cost 
improvements the least frequent, then this sample of European companies would be building up lasting 
manufacturing capabilities according to our model. 
The results are shown in Figure 3. Cost and delivery have improved more frequently than quality. 
Looking at this positively, one may conclude that perhaps most of these European manufacturers are 
remedying the slacks in their production systems, bringing them at par with the global standards; 
however, if we assume that most of these large manufacturers in our sample were already at their industry 
standards, then our model sheds a negative light: that many of the achievements reported by our 
respondents might not be based on deep and lasting enhancement of the management of their 
manufacturing function.  
 
 
Figure 3: Frequency of Simultaneous Improvements 
 
Note: This chart shows the frequency of improvement of each indicator simultaneously with at least one of the other three 
indicators. 
Source: 1988 European Manufacturing Futures Survey (De Meyer and Ferdows, 1988) 
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CONCLUSION  
If we accept that the development of one manufacturing capability need not be necessarily at the expense 
of another, then we should re-examine a) traditional managerial approaches for improving manufacturing 
performance, and b) the long-term role of manufacturing in the competitive strategy of the firm.  
Most of the traditional managerial approaches for improving manufacturing performance are based on the 
trade-off theory. We are suggesting the trade-off theory does not apply in all cases. Rather, certain 
approaches change the trade-off relationship into a cumulative one—i.e., one capability is built upon 
another, not in its place.  
Moreover, we are suggesting that under these conditions, every layer of capability requires continuous 
attention; one never leaves the necessity of investing in the “basics” of production. In fact, the higher and 
fancier the capability sought, the more enhancement from the bottom layer of capability up is required. (It 
is like building up bigger sand cones by pouring on more sand).  
All this stands even if we have erred on the last prescription of our model. We suggest that the approach 
which avoids trade-offs and ensures cumulative buildup of manufacturing capabilities in the long run is 
one which in broad terms focuses on quality first, then quality and dependability, then quality, 
dependability and flexibility, and finally on all three plus cost efficiency. This sequence builds up lasting 
and deep manufacturing capabilities.  
Applying this model requires a long-term approach, tolerance, and patience. It requires believing that 
costs will eventually come down. The important thing is to establish milestones to ensure that the 
company stays on the right track. Our model is rather specific in this respect. If performance in the 
generic capabilities of quality, delivery, flexibility and cost efficiency progressively improve (i.e., none of 
the earlier ones regress or stay stagnant when a later one improves), then the company is on the right track 
toward building lasting manufacturing strength.  
Capabilities built in this way become formidable competitive weapons; they cannot be easily or quickly 
matched by competitors. Embarking on this course requires a commitment to expand the role of 
manufacturing in the competitive strategy of the company. Otherwise, the arguments for going directly 
after one capability at the expense of the others will prevail.  
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ENDNOTE  
1The European manufacturing futures project is part of a larger project, the Global Manufacturing futures 
Project, administered in North America by J. G. Miller and A. Roth (Boston University), in Japan by J. 
Nakane (Waseda University, Tokyo), and in Europe by K. Ferdows and A. De Meyer (INSEAD, 
Fontainebleau).  
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APPENDIX 1 
DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE 
In 1988, we received 187 answers out of 850 questionnaires mailed. The 187 responding companies are 
from 14 European countries, and, on the basis of a two-digit Standard Industrial Code, can be classified in 
19 industrial groups. The responding sample is therefore from a large variety of industries and countries 
and not biased towards a particular industry or a geographic region.  
The unit of analysis (called “business unit”), for which most of the questions were answered, was chosen 
by the respondents: 39% answered for an entire company, 41% for a division or group and 20% for a 
plant.  
The average respondent was a large, profitable and growing business unit which operated internationally, 
and likely to be the market leader for its primary product or product family (Table A 1). Of course, not all 
respondents were profitable and growing; 6% reported a loss for the last fiscal year, and 8% a negative 
growth.  
The typical business unit made 55% of its sales through its primary product or product family. A large 
share of its total sales, 28%, was coming from products which were on offer for less than two years; in 
three years’ time this proportion was expected to reach 33%.  
Manufacturing was important to the respondents: on the average, the current manufacturing cost is 65% 
of the business unit’s sales. The medians of the components of these costs are shown in Table A2. (We 
show the medians to minimize the bias caused by the “outliers”.)  
The average total number of people employed by the business units was 4585. The distribution of this 
number was highly skewed. The median is only 840. This median is expected to rise to 943 in two years’ 
time. Since we assume that this does not reflect a trend towards a reduction of the capital intensity of the 
business units, this must be an indication of the intention to grow, and perhaps of a general impression of 
optimism which characterized the average manufacturer in our sample this year. The median direct labor 
component of the work force was 300 or 36% of the total labor force.  
All these numbers tend to indicate that our average respondent was a large, profitable and growing 
business unit, for which the manufacturing function plays an important role now and was expected to do 
so in the future. It was depending primarily on its internal resources to introduce more new products and 
expand its market share. In general, our respondents seemed to be optimistic about the future.  
 
TABLE Al: Characteristics of the Respondents  
Median of annual sales revenues ECU 1.2 Billion 
Average pretax return on assets 16.4% 
Average pre-tax profit as a % of sales 7.8% 
Average market share of primary product 26.5% 
Average market share of main competition 22.8% 
Average growth rate (units sold) 11.3% 
Average number of countries in which the respondent has plants 2.3 
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Table A2: Median Current and Expected Cost Structure 
  Current  Expected in 2 Years’ Time 
Total manufacturing costs as a % of sales 65%  62% 
R&D expenses as a % of sales 3%  
Allocation of manufacturing costs to:   
- materials 58%  56% 
- direct labor 15%  15% 
- energy 3%  3% 
- manufacturing overheads of which: 20%  20% 
- indirect salaries, wages, fringes  50%  
- depreciation & facilities expenses  20%  
- corporate allocations  15%  
- other  16%  
Note: Since these numbers are the medians, they do not necessarily add up to 100.  
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APPENDIX 2 
LIST OF MANUFACTURING IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS 
Included in 1988 European Manufacturing Futures Survey Questionnaire 
Giving workers a broad range of tasks  
Giving workers more planning responsibility  
Changing labor management relationships  
Manufacturing reorganization  
Worker safety  
Worker training 
Management training  
Supervisor training  
Preventive maintenance  
Zero defects  
Manufacturing lead-time reduction  
Vendor lead-time reduction 
Computer-aided manufacturing  
Computer-aided design  
Reducing setup/changeover time  
Value analysis/product redesign  
Group technology  
Capacity expansion  
Reducing size of manufacturing units  
Plant relocation  
Developing new processes for new products  
Developing new processes for old products  
Narrowing product lines/standardizing 
Defining a manufacturing strategy  
Integrating information systems between manufacturing and other functions  
Integrating information systems within manufacturing  
Vendor quality  
Reconditioning of physical plants  
Just-in-Time  
Robots  
Flexible manufacturing systems 
Closing plants  
Statistical quality control (product)  
Statistical quality control (process)  
Improving new product introduction capability  
Quality circles  
Automating jobs  
Production/inventory control systems  
Reducing the size of manufacturing work force (including hourly and salaried)  
